1. The birth mother never signed an agreement acknowledging that the identity of the sperm donor would remain anonymous, and alleged that she had conversations with the sperm bank in which it was represented the donor would play a role in the potential children’s upbringing.

2. Disclosure was sought, in part, on the basis of the mothers’ contention that the twins alleged to have been created through artificial insemination suffered from genetic disorders, thus making the dissemination of information about the donor of potentially vital interest to the welfare of the children;

3. As the insemination and birth of the children took place (using sperm alleged to have originated in Massachusetts) in England, where it appears the use of anonymous gamete donors is far more restricted than in the US, the Court noted there were serious questions as to whether English, rather than Massachustts law applied to the case.

The holding of the Appeals Court was little more than one stating it would not disturb an order providing for “in camera” (confidential) discovery by an intermediary of the identity of the alleged donor, the existence of the alleged genetic disorder, and whether the alleged sperm donor was the biological parent of the children in question. Given the unique (and in some respects, bizarre) facts set forth in the pleadings, I don’t think the opinion indicates (at least in the absence of the presence of serious genetic disorders) that Massachusetts courts are likely to compel the disclosure of the identity of sperm (or egg) donors where both the donor and the recipient(s) had expressly agreed to donor and recipient confidentiality vis-a-vis each other. While the ultimate resolution of the case may be of interest, I doubt it will have much of an effect on the law of assisted reproduction under protocols I believe are ordinarily followed in the US.